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Abstract
Phylogenetic models traditionally represent the history of life as having a strictly-
branching tree structure. However, it is becoming increasingly clear that the history of
life is often not strictly-branching; lateral gene transfer, endosymbiosis, and hybridiza-
tion, for example, can all produce lateral branching events. There is thus motivation
to allow phylogenetic models to have a reticulate structure. One proposal involves the
reconciliation of genealogical discordance. Briefly, this method involves using patterns
of disagreement – discordance – between trees of different genes to add lateral branch-
ing events to phylogenetic trees of taxa, and to estimate the most likely cause of these
events. I use this practice to argue for: (1) a need for expanded accounts of multiple-
models idealization, (2) a distinction between automatic and manual de-idealization,
and (3) recognition that idealization may serve the meso-level aims of science in a
different way than hitherto acknowledged.
Keywords— phylogenetics, idealization, genealogical discordance, lateral gene transfer, hy-
bridization
1 Introduction
Phylogenetic models are a crucial tool for understanding the history of life on Earth. The theory
of evolution by natural selection itself may suggest that the history of life has a strictly-branching
structure, in which populations diverge as the result of accumulated variation over time. However,
in recent decades it has become apparent that the history of life does not have a strictly-branching
structure, because numerous instances of merging or genetic exchange between otherwise discon-
nected lineages have been reported. Incorporating these instances into the tree of life would give
this tree a reticulate structure. If we want our phylogenetic models to be accurate, they have to
allow for reticulation, when appropriate. Yet, the historically dominant methods for constructing
phylogenetic models explicitly disallow lateral branches.
1
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Biologists and philosophers have espoused many solutions to this problem, including suggest-
ing a departure between the explanatory target of phylogenetics and historical reconstructions or
recommending new algorithms that allow for lateral branches. One suggestion which has received
recent philosophical attention is the thought that disagreement between phylogenetic trees con-
structed on the basis of gene histories, a phenomenon known as genealogical discordance, can be
used as a signal of lateral branching episodes, as well as their likely causes. Roughly, the idea is
that lateral branching will create signature patterns of genealogical discordance, such that when
these patterns are detected we can infer that certain kinds of lateral branching have likely occurred.
In this paper, I am interested in the philosophical implications of using genealogical discordance
in this way, in particular for the philosophy of modeling. After reviewing the history and develop-
ment of reticulate phylogenetic trees in section 2, and explaining the methods using genealogical
discordance in section 3, I will elaborate on implications of this practice within philosophy of mod-
eling (section 4). I will argue for three related claims: First, these phylogenetic methods are not
captured well by existing discussions of multiple model idealizations (cf. Wimsatt, 1987; Weisberg,
2007, 2013). Second, the idealizations involved in these methods contribute to the development of
truer, de-idealized phylogenetic models in a different way than has been recognized in the philo-
sophical literature on phylogenetics, because de-idealization in this case happens automatically
rather than manually (cf. Velasco, 2012). And third, this contribution of idealization to the aims
of phylogeneticists is unmediated by increased understanding (cf. Potochnik, 2017).
These claims contribute to the literature on philosophy of scientific models. Philosophers have
long been interested in the utility of making false or idealizing assumptions, and I extend the role
of idealization beyond what has hitherto been recognized.
2 Phylogenetic Models
This section will review some of the history of phylogenetic reconstructions, including especially
the eventual recognition that phylogenetic trees might have a reticulate structure.
In around 1837, Charles Darwin drew a tree-shaped structure in a notebook, to symbolize the
divergence of species (figure 1a). Darwin was not the first to conceptualize the history of life as
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a branching tree, but it did cohere with his theory of evolution to do so, and the tree structure
gave him a model by which to explain how the extant diversity of life could have emerged from
a common ancestor. Many other scholars picked up on the tree as a way to claim particular
relationships between different taxa. For example, one from Hitchcock (1840) is shown in figure
1c, and two from Haeckel (1866, 1879) are in figures 1d and 1e. The tree which ultimately made it
into the Origin of Species is in figure 1b.
For about one hundred years, such a tree-like structure was the primary way to conceive of the
history of life on earth. Indeed, one prevalent thought was that agreement (convergence) between
trees constructed using different taxa or different methods would have provided proof that the
history of life had a tree-like structure, so many researchers went to work trying to develop these
trees (Doolittle & Brunet, 2016, p. 2). The problem is that we now know that the history of life
did not have a tree-like structure, at least insofar as tree-like structures are strictly branching.
Strictly-branching tree diagrams are those with branches that, once they diverge, can never meet
again.
Lynn Margulis (1967; 1970) famously proposed that a few instances of endosymbiosis had oc-
curred in the past, and had radically affected the sorts of biological structures which were possible.
Endosymbiosis occurs when two organisms form a symbiotic relationship such that one of them
resides within the other. This can result in the two organisms coming to seem more like a single,
unified entity, perhaps even jointly becoming one biological individual. The most well-known and
agreed-upon instances of endosymbiosis are that of eukaryotes with the mitochondria and chloro-
plasts, both originally free-living bacteria which now form essential organelles in many eukaryotic
cells. (See figure 2a for one of her attempts to integrate endosymbiosis into the tree of life.)
Endosymbiosis implies that the tree of life would indeed have to have a reticulate structure, or
one where branches can reconnect, and therefore one which is not strictly-branching. For example,
in the case of mitochondrial endosymbiosis, the branch that mitochondria are on and the branch
with their hosts merge to become a single lineage.
Margulis’ idea was controversial, but it caught on in different academic circles to different
degrees. For example, the diagram in Fox et al. (1980), shown in figure 2b, indicates authors’ resis-
tance to a high propensity of endosymbiosis, only allowing that it occurred in the uncontroversial
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(a) Darwin (c. 1837) (b) Darwin (1859)
(c) Hitchcock (1840); drawn
by Orra White Hitchcock (d) Haeckel (1866) (e) Haeckel (1879)
Figure 1: Five examples of early strictly-branching trees. Figures (1a)-(1e) are all in the
public domain.
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case of eukaryotic cell formation (and even then not really representing that as two reconnected
branches on the tree). The diagram in Doolittle (1999), shown in figure 2c, by contrast, is maybe
less precise but indicates openness to rampant endosymbiosis or perhaps other forms of branch-
merging. Note that at around this same time biologists were beginning to understand how often
different taxa of bacteria exchange genetic material horizontally.
Martin (1999) gives yet another slightly more precise version of a reticulated tree (figure 2d),
allowing for many instances of reticulation but being a bit more specific about where they occurred.
However, part of the text which accompanies the image says that this diagram “is not an answer
to a question. It is a picture of a problem” (see Martin’s caption to his fig. 2).
In brief, the problem is the standard algorithms we use to form phylogenetic trees, including
cladistic or parsimony methods, maximum likelihood, and Bayesian methods. These standard
algorithms all involve collecting a number of different characteristics of different taxa and comparing
them, thereby making a tree that matches the data. Historically, and to some extent still today,
some of the specifics of phylogenetic algorithms have been debated. Interest in phylogenetics among
philosophers of science was piqued by Sober (1988), who laid out some of the main debates about
phylogenetic methodology, some of which have continued (for example, regarding parsimony, see
Felsenstein, 1978; Farris, 1983 but also more recently Huelsenbeck & Lander, 2003; Kolaczkowski &
Thornton, 2004; Farris, 2008). For the purpose of this paper, the crucial fact is that the algorithms
in general assume a strictly-branching structure, when we know that the history of life does not
have such a structure.
This problem is even worse when we consider that endosymbiosis is not the only process that
can generate lateral branches in a phylogenetic tree; such sources of reticulation are numerous and
can affect all forms of life.
One primary source of reticulation in phylogenetic trees is lateral gene transfer. Lateral gene
transfer occurs when the genes of one cell enter another cell and become part of the genome of
the new cell. We know of three ways that this can happen: transformation, transduction, and
conjugation (Ochman et al., 2000). In transformation, a recipient cell takes in genetic materials
from its environment and starts using them to encode for proteins. In transduction, a virus called
a bacteriophage transfers DNA to a recipient cell. And in conjugation, one cell implants its DNA
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(a) Margulis (1970) (b) Fox et al. (1980)
(c) Doolittle (1999) (d) Martin (1999)
Figure 2: Four examples of reticulated trees. Permission pending on figure reuse.
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into a recipient cell. We used to think that only microorganisms, in particular prokaryotic cells and
viruses, could be involved in lateral gene transfer, but we now know that actually many prokaryotic
bacteria can transfer their genes to eukaryotic cells, including those of large, multicellular organisms,
especially via transduction (Hotopp et al., 2007). Lateral gene transfer will affect the rest of the cell
line, whether somatic or germ line, including the potential for those genes to be inherited vertically
between parents and offspring if the germ line cells have been affected. Primarily, though, lateral
gene transfer occurs between bacteria and viruses; indeed, we now think that it happens with a
relatively high frequency, and has been involved in several major evolutionary innovations (Boucher
et al., 2003; Zhaxybayeva & Doolittle, 2011). The frequency of lateral gene transfer is one of the
reasons why scientists have found it hard to come up with low-level taxonomic classification of
bacteria (e.g., Ochman et al., 2005; Bapteste & Boucher, 2008). For a further discussion of the
implications of LGT for phylogenetics, see O’Malley (2014, p. 80-84, 101-108).
Another important source of reticulation is hybridization (including introgression), where mem-
bers of two species produce offspring together.1 Often, hybridization happens between plants –
many plants can be cross-pollinated and then produce hybrids; this is often useful in an agricul-
tural context (e.g., Whitney et al., 2010). However, hybridization happens in the animal kingdom
as well – for example, grizzly bears and polar bears can reproduce together, a phenomenon which
many predict will occur more often as the result of climate change, because the overlap between
their ranges is expanding (e.g., Kutschera et al., 2014; Pongracz et al., 2017). If we do count
hybridization as occurring between truly different species, then a population which resulted from
hybridization may be represented by two branches on their phylogenetic tree merging back into
one.2
1This is a little problematic for the biological species concept – I won’t dwell on that here.
2There are other possible sources of reticulation, depending on the object of study, although these are
unlikely to be analyzed using the same kinds of algorithms as LGT and hybridization. First, there are
instances of endosymbiosis which do not initiate major biological transitions. The other – very common –
type of endosymbiosis occurs when a microorganism colonizes a larger organism as an obligate symbiont.
For example, our microbiome is very important to our health (Dowd & Renson, 2018). A lot of the taxa in
our microbiome we inherited vertically (e.g., Moeller et al., 2018), but some of our microbiome we receive
horizontally (e.g., Tung et al., 2015). These episodes of endosymbiosis wouldn’t necessarily be registered
in a tree of life, because most people still think that the taxa that make up our microbiome should be on
different branches of the tree than we are. But, depending on how you conceive of a biological individual,
for example, we may or may not contain our microbiome in just the same way as a eukaryotic cell contains
its mitochondria (for discussion, see, e.g., Skillings, 2016; Doolittle & Booth, 2017; O’Malley, 2014, p. 108-
117). It is therefore reasonable to include transfer of symbiotic microbes as one of the (possible) sources of
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The leading algorithms to determine evolutionary relationships, though, are not equipped to
accommodate these sources of reticulation. However, lateral branching, whatever its cause, is
common, and therefore cannot just be accommodated on a case-by-case basis. Insofar as the
standard algorithms will necessarily exclude instances of reticulation, they seem ill-equipped to
form an accurate diagram of the history of life. As Velasco (2012, p. 630) says:3
If you don’t bother looking for lateral events, you will build a tree that is capable of
fitting the data and may not notice that anything has gone awry. Standard phylogenetic
methods simply assume that the data is generated from a tree process and then find
the best tree to fit the data. . . One simply cannot detect lateral events unless you
specifically look for them. And there is no way of knowing ahead of time if you are
working with a group where lateral events play an important causal and explanatory
role.
One solution would be to create a new algorithm. Several replacements have been proposed,
reticulation.
Second, reticulation may occur when subpopulations of the same species re-mix. For example, although
the human species originated in a relatively small geographic area and then spread across the globe, it has
recently come to light that this dispersion included many episodes of groups re-uniting and reproducing
across group boundaries. So, if we were to construct an intraspecific human phylogeny, it would definitely
have a reticulate structure (Hawks & Cochran, 2006; Reich, 2018). This serves as good evidence that race is
not biologically real – if biologically real races require isolated human populations, such a thing basically has
never existed (cf. Andreasen, 2000). Humans apparently tend to meet up with one another and reproduce
when they do so, meaning we need to replace our strictly-branching pictures of human evolution with
“an interwoven plexus of genetic lineages that branch out and fuse once again with the passage of time”
(Finlayson, 2013).
Third, cultural evolution may also provide another context in which reticulation is rampant, although it
will not be very relevant to the focus of this paper. Many species acquire some of their characteristics from
individuals other than their biological parents. Any sort of knowledge can be acquired elsewhere, along with
many behavioral traits. Take language, for example: although your parents do help teach you language,
they are certainly not the only ones. Probably you can think of words that you learned from someone
other than your parents. That would be a case of horizontal inheritance, which would generate reticulation
on a tree that represented the spread of language. One note here is that cultural inheritance has been
used to show that some acquired characteristics can be inherited – for example, say I learn how to speak
Spanish as an adult, and then I teach my children how to speak Spanish. They have now inherited that
trait from me vertically, whereas I acquired it horizontally. Thus, the lines between horizontal and vertical
inheritance can be blurred. (For a variety of cases of inheritance which complicate the dichotomy between
horizontal and vertical inheritance, see Jablonka & Lamb, 2005.) Furthermore, although humans may take
special advantage of cultural inheritance, similar mechanisms apply in a range of other biological contexts,
including transmission of birdsong (e.g., Aplin, 2019). For some recent philosophical discussions of cultural
inheritance, see Sterelny (2012); Heyes (2018).
3Cf. Quinn (2016), who seems to think that phylogenetics involves considering all possible trees, when
only all strictly-branching trees are considered.
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not all of which can be reviewed in detail here. For example, though, Velasco and Sober (2010)
suggest one way to adjudicate between cases of independent evolution and cases of reticulation.
Considerations of parsimony will often weigh in favor of independent evolution (reticulation requires
adding another branch, thereby increasing the number of model components; although sometimes
adding a branch will decrease the number of independent character changes needed to explain the
data), whereas data fit might weigh in favor of reticulation, depending on the data. Velasco and
Sober recommend use of the Akaike Information Criterion, which is a way to score the model
taking into consideration both parsimony and data fit. This criterion will sometimes recommend
trees with a reticulate structure, and sometimes will not.
Proponents of standard phylogenetic algorithms could, hypothetically, respond to proposals like
this one by saying that they are not, in fact, purporting to give an actual tree of life – for instance,
perhaps a phylogenetic tree does not purport to show historical relationships between taxa, but
only relations of similarity and difference.4 This argument is perhaps tenable as a response to the
problems raised by reticulation: models should not be misunderstood to encapsulate phenomena
that they were never meant to represent. Of course, in general, researchers do use trees as though
they contain historical information. So, maintaining a distinction between phylogenetic trees and
historically-oriented diagrams would come at the expense of abandoning this common use case.
In sum, then, there are several interrelated problems with current phylogenetic algorithms.
First of all, many of these methods do not allow for lateral branching at all, despite the fact that
we know that depicting the history of life often requires the use of a reticulate structure. Second,
in order to apply existing methods for detecting various sources of reticulation, one often has to
have good reason to believe in advance that such reticulation has occurred; indeed, some methods
that do allow for lateral branching are not always able to accommodate the multiple sources of
reticulation, such as endosymbiosis, LGT, and hybridization, so one may even have to know in
advance which sources of reticulation are most likely in order to know what algorithms to apply
to a given case. Third, restricting the scope of phylogenetic trees to showing only relationships of
similarity and difference isn’t a particularly helpful suggestion, because depictions of similarity and
4So-called “pattern cladists” used to go this route, although their views have fallen out of favor. See
Williams and Ebach (2007) for a historical overview (although not an endorsement) of this position.
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difference are not necessarily depictions of historical relationships, and one of the main functions
of phylogenetic trees within evolutionary biology is to test various hypotheses about the historical
relationships between taxa. These three problems correspond to three questions philosophers and
biologists may ask: (1) When are strictly-branching trees useful, and why? (2) How do we know
whether to test for reticulation in a given case, before we have applied the algorithms that can
detect it? and (3) What, exactly, should we take phylogenetic trees to represent?
In the next section, I will go into more detail on a particular method for detecting lateral
branching events, one which relates to all of these questions. Then, I will argue that this method
motivates an expansion of some accounts of the usefulness of idealization in model-based science
(section 4).
3 Genealogical Discordance
Although genealogical discordance has received some attention from philosophers (see especially
the special issue of Philosophy, Theory, and Practice in Biology edited by Haber and Molter), I
will focus on the implications of genealogical discordance for philosophy of modeling, a topic which
to my knowledge has not been discussed in the philosophical literature. To this end, I will first
give an overview of genealogical discordance, and the ways in which it is used to study sources
of reticulation. I will not be arguing in favor of using genealogical discordance to detect lateral
episodes; rather, I think that the method is of philosophical interest, as will become clearer in
section 4.
Genealogical discordance occurs when different phylogenetic histories (e.g., gene trees) which
are supposed to represent the same lineage of a particular biological entity (e.g., a species tree)
disagree (Haber, 2019, p. 2). This can happen, for example, when trees formed on the basis of
different genes within the same organisms or taxa show different branching relationships between
these organisms or taxa. In other words, “lineages are leaky” (Haber, 2012, p. 612), so the tree at
one hierarchical level (e.g., genes) may look different from the tree at another level (e.g., species).
Horizontal exchange of genes, whether by LGT or some other means, can produce genealogical
discordance. One early example of a paper which recognized this possibility is Brown and Doolittle
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(1997): “Horizontal gene transfer . . . could result in a gene tree radically different from the species
phylogeny” (p. 462). The authors used traditional phylogenetic methods on several different
proteins, a process which produced many different trees. They then argued that LGT is a good
explanation for the places in the models where the protein trees differed.
There is a lot to say about genealogical discordance from a philosophical perspective. For
instance, there can be discordance within one level (i.e., different gene trees that are both supposed
to represent the same species tree can disagree with one another), or between levels (i.e., gene trees
can disagree with the species tree); this highlights that gene trees are imperfect proxies for species
trees and complicates the matter of what our phylogenetic trees are of (Haber, 2012; Maddison,
1997). However, I will focus on how researchers cope with discordance.
Genealogical discordance can be treated in roughly two different ways, what Haber (2019)
calls resolution and reconciliation (p. 10), in response to Felsenstein (1988) saying, “Most of the
interesting issues in phylogeneny reconstruction are in how to resolve these conflicts” (p. 524,
emphasis added). Haber (following Nakhleh, 2013) says that resolution of genealogical discordance
is not the only way to address it: reconciliation of genealogical discordance is also a possibility. I
will discuss each of these approaches in turn.5
Historically, genealogical discordance was resolved by choosing an ultimate tree (say, of species)
which was best supported by the set of individual trees (say, of genes). Degnan and Rosenberg (2006)
summarize this approach: “In typical phylogenetic studies of individual genes, the estimated gene
tree topology is used as the estimate of the species tree topology. When many loci are studied,
the species tree topology is often estimated using the most frequently inferred gene tree topology”
(p. 762; see also Maddison, 1997). For instance, if 100 gene histories for the taxa of interest are
modeled and 95 of them agree on a particular topology, then that topology is presumed to be the
most accurate representation of the relationships between the taxa, ignoring the gene histories for
the five genes which discord with the dominant tree topology.
There are several problems with this approach. First, as the reader should by now be well
aware, this standard approach to resolving discordance does not account for the various sources
5The distinction between resolution and reconciliation of genealogical discordance roughly corresponds to
the distinction between concatenation and coalescence-based methods, respectively. For a historical overview,
see Quinn (2019).
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of reticulation. Choosing the most likely strictly-branching tree from a set of discordant strictly-
branching trees will never produce a tree with a reticulate structure. Second, though, this approach
has theoretical problems even outside of the context of reticulation. Degnan and Rosenberg (2006)
showed that, for trees with greater than five taxa (and, for some trees with four taxa), there will
always be the possibility of “anomalous gene trees,” or trees of genes which are more likely than the
gene trees which match the actual species tree. Therefore, assuming that the species tree topology
matches that of the most likely gene tree will be misleading.6 These problems may lead one to
be skeptical of the possibility of using discordant trees at all: for example, Doolittle (1999) wrote
that if “different genes give different trees, and there is no fair way to suppress this disagreement,
then a species (or phylum) can ‘belong’ to many genera (or kingdoms) at the same time: There
really can be no universal phylogenetic tree of organisms based on such a reduction to genes” (p.
2128). Luckily, we are able to handle genealogical discordance without resorting to the genetic
reductionism with which Doolittle was concerned.
Instead, one can “use the signal provided by discordant gene trees to infer species trees” (Quinn,
2019, p. 2). One possibility is that the fact of genealogical discordance – or, patterns thereof – can
be useful in identifying sources of reticulation. As Baum (2007) and Degnan and Rosenberg (2009)
point out, some of the reasons for genealogical discordance have to do with sources of reticulation.
If a representative set of gene trees are used, for example, likely instances of lateral gene transfer
will be evidenced by one “primary” history, one tree which applies to most of the genes, and one
“minor” history, a tree which applies to only a small subset of genes, those which were subject
to lateral transfer (Baum, 2007, p. 418); this inference is depicted in figures 3a-3c. The primary
gene history is taken to be equivalent to the species tree, with the exception of an LGT event that
accommodates the minor gene history; the genes with the minor gene history are the ones which
are laterally transferred, such that you can see the minor gene history “on top of” the primary gene
history in figure 3c.7 Similarly, cases of hybridization will likely look like two “coprimary” histories,
one history for each of the two hybridizing lineages, both with ample representation in the genome
6Degnan et al. (2009) provide one solution to this problem, although it is outside of the context of
reticulation and therefore not particularly relevant to the content of this paper.
7Note that this pattern may also appear for cases of endosymbiosis, if the minor history is specifically
associated with the genome of an organelle such as the mitochondria, or perhaps with other obligate sym-
bionts.
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(a) Primary gene history
A B C




(d) Coprimary gene history
A B C
(e) Coprimary gene history
A B C
(f) Inferred hybridization
Figure 3: Examples of inferring sources of reticulation from genealogical discordance. In
3a-3c, an episode of lateral gene transfer is inferred from genealogical discordance where
there is a primary gene history (3a) and a minor gene history (3b). In 3d-3f, an episode of
hybridization is inferred on the basis of genealogical discordance where there are two distinct
coprimary gene histories (3d and 3e). For related figures, see Maddison (1997); Degnan and
Rosenberg (2006, 2009). In both 3c and 3f, the colors are used to show where the gene
histories agree (dashed line with both colors) and where they disagree (solid color matching
the relevant gene history), such that it is possible to see how the different gene histories
“overlap” to form the inferred tree.
as a whole (Baum, 2007, p. 418); this inference is depicted in figures 3d-3f. Other than reticulation,
patterns of genealogical discordance may indicate other episodes as well, such as incomplete lineage
sorting (for discussion, see Haber, 2019). Any of these situations can be identified by contrast to
other hypotheses, in this case that any genealogical discordance is the result of stochastic processes,
i.e. random mutation. This brings us to Haber (2019)’s recommendation that discordant trees
can also be reconciled, in some circumstances, rather than resolved. Reconciliation here involves
recognizing that discordance between trees might be a “product of the underlying processes of
lineage generation that can produce discordance” (p. 11). In other words, discordance might be
evidence that the various processes which result in genealogical discordance have actually occurred.
Sources of reticulation such as LGT and hybridization are some of these processes.
Reconciling genealogical discordance thus involves using two (or more) models which, by stip-
ulation, do not allow for lateral branches to infer the presence of a lateral branch. In philosophy of
modeling parlance, we might say that this is a case where two false models – false because of the
idealizing assumption that no lateral branches ever occur – are used as a means to a truer claim.
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In other words, models which alone are inadequate for positing lateral events can be useful in com-
bination towards this end. Note that the strictly-branching trees are not necessarily inadequate as
gene trees, but are inadequate as species (or higher taxa) trees, so the transition between different
types of trees is also important for this method. For further discussion of the hierarchical “nesting”
(or lack thereof) of different types of trees or lineages, see Haber (2012); Neto (2019, 2020).
Let me now give two detailed examples of the reconciliation method in operation, both of which
show that this method is a bit more complicated in practice than in principle. Singhal and Moritz
(2012) found genealogical discordance between two species of Austrailian rainforest lizards. First,
Singhal and Moritz used a standard algorithm (in this case, a Bayesian approach) to generate gene
trees on a variety of nuclear and mitochondrial gene loci. There was more genealogical discordance
between the mitochondrial genomes than the nuclear genomes. This is a pattern of discordance that
indicates the possibility of a type of hybridization (namely, introgression), since the mitochondrial
genes are inherited solely through the maternal line, effectively providing two co-primary gene
histories. The researchers tested three each of two types of models for fit to these data: species
trees with and without introgressive hybridization, i.e. a lateral branching event like that seen in
figure 3f. The particular trees with introgression were chosen based on what was known about
the area’s biogeography, including possible historical opportunities for the related species to have
interbred. The significant discordance between the nuclear and mitochondrial genes trees enabled
the inference that a species tree which contained more mitochondrial gene flow between species
was best supported by the data. The authors argue (with uncertainty, of course) that sex-specific
processes best explain this particular pattern of introgression; because mitochondria are exclusively
passed on through the maternal line, this indicates that the hybridization which occurred between
the lineages under study was likely a matter of increased maternal gene flow from one lineage to
another.
Morales-Briones et al. (2021) provide another recent example of the reconciliation method.
Morales-Briones et al. were, again, using genealogical discordance between major and minor gene
histories to detect an episode of hybridization, this time in the family Amaranthacaea s.1. Morales-
Briones et al. used a maximum likelihood method to reconstruct the trees for 936 nuclear genes, a
subset of which were informative for any given node. These gene trees allowed for the detection of
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discordance. The researchers found concordance indicating monophyly at the family level (agree-
ment in 922 of 930 informative genes), but discordance at other significant nodes (e.g., only 231
out of 632 informative gene trees agreed on monophyly of the Chenopodiaceae subfamily). They
identified five candidate hybridization events based on these different gene histories, depending on
the maximum number of reticulations stipulated by the modelers. The researchers concluded that
the best explanation for the patterns of discordance is a combination of introgression and incom-
plete lineage sorting (p. 229). Importantly, unlike Singhal and Moritz (2012), Morales-Briones et
al. tested multiple hypotheses for lateral branching episodes, rather than just comparing one model
with hybridization to a strictly-branching model, and the researchers recommend this strategy (over
others, like network methods), especially in the case of ancient radiations. Morales-Briones et al.
also call for more research on how to use genealogical discordance when multiple different sources of
reticulation may be occurring in one clade; the methods outlined above do not offer any instruction
on this more complex matter.
Before moving on, I would like to again emphasize that my focus on these methods involving
genealogical discordance should not be taken to indicate my approval of use of these methods in
all circumstances involving reticulation. For instance, there is a reason that this section has almost
exclusively focused on hybridization and LGT: the methods discussed in this section are equipped
to identify signals of hybridization and LGT, but other methods may be needed to identify other
sources of reticulation, such as endosymbiosis. Additionally, there are other ways that reticulation
episodes can be inferred, and it is outside the scope of this paper to explain and evaluate them all
(for a review of other methods in the context of LGT, see Ragan, 2001). Algorithms and models
alike are adequate for a research purpose (Parker, 2020), and I do not purport to be showing that
a given method for tree construction is any better or worse than another. It may even be the case
that the methods using genealogical discordance are eventually rejected entirely (for a discussion
of some of the objections to these methods, see Quinn, 2019).
This section demonstrated that – sometimes – tree-shaped phylogenetic diagrams, formed using
algorithms which do not allow lateral branching, can help us identify that lateral branching has
in fact occurred. Genealogical discordance can, instead of being resolved by choosing the most
likely of a set of trees, be reconciled by postulating that an event which would cause genealogical
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discordance in fact occurred. In general, this is a case where a set of models, each individually
inadequate for identifying lateral branching events, are in combination able to identify them. The
next section expands on this result, which has implications for views about the appropriate role of
idealization in science.
4 Implications: Purposes of Idealization
In this section, I discuss implications of these methods for the role of idealization in modeling. In
brief, I will argue that the methods using genealogical discordance illustrate a case where idealized
or false models produce truer conclusions. However, I will suggest that this case is different from
other accounts of the utility of idealizations in the philosophy of modeling literature. First, I will
explain more thoroughly how it is that idealization operates in the reconciliation of genealogical
discordance.
I claim that methods using genealogical discordance to infer reticulated phylogenetic trees
involve a particular use of idealized models to produce truer conclusions. The idealized models,
in this case, are the two or more strictly-branching trees (usually, gene trees) constructed using
one of the standard algorithms for making trees (e.g., maximum likelihood methods). The relevant
idealization is that these trees are required by the algorithms to be strictly branching. The gene trees
themselves, as gene trees, are not idealized in this way; gene trees can be expected to be strictly-
branching even when trees that represent relations between taxa like species cannot. But the gene
trees as representations of species trees are idealized; in other words, we make an idealization when
we assume that the species tree will, like the gene tree, be strictly-branching, an idealization that
enables us to use gene trees to represent species trees. Even if it is not known in a particular
case whether the assumption that the species tree is strictly-branching is a false assumption, it is
an assumption held without regard for whether it is true, and is thus an idealization (Potochnik,
2017).
Of course, there are other idealizations involved in the construction of phylogenetic trees, even
reticulated ones. For example, even in the methods involving reconciliation of genealogical dis-
cordance, there can sometimes be a conflation between gene trees and species trees, or at least
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an assumed relationship between gene trees and species trees that doesn’t necessarily hold. Yet,
systematists often use the simplifying assumption that gene trees are a good proxy for species
trees, because what they have data on is genetic characteristics while what they are interested in
is relationships among species or higher taxa. I do not dispute that the ultimate, reticulated trees
resulting from reconciliation of genealogical discordance are still idealized, in this or other ways.
But in order to maintain the assumption that gene trees are good proxies for species trees, it is
necessary to remove the assumption that all trees are strictly-branching. It is this latter idealization
on which this paper is focused.
How is the idealization involving strict branching used in the reconciliation of genealogical dis-
cordance? As I hope is clear on the basis of the discussion of these methods in section 3, the
construction of strictly-branching trees is a necessary step in these methods for the ultimate con-
struction of a reticulated tree. Patterns of genealogical discordance – patterns of disagreement
among strictly-branching trees – are the basis on which a reticulated tree is constructed. Evidence
of genealogical discordance itself requires construction of the strictly-branching trees. Furthermore,
this requirement is not imposed by anything like the psychological limitations of the researchers
(which, as we will see shortly, is one reason for idealization often referred to in the literature).
Rather, the algorithm that generates a potentially reticulated tree automatically combines infor-
mation on multiple strictly-branching (idealized) trees in order to remove exactly this idealization.
I will now compare the use of idealization in this case to other uses of idealization in models,
and show that the case of genealogical discordance does not easily fit into previously-recognized
uses of idealization.
4.1 Multi-model idealizations
The method of reconciling genealogical discordance described above does not fit neatly into existing
accounts of how multiple, idealized models are used in combination in science.
By far the most influential accounts of multiple-models idealization are Wimsatt (1987) and
Weisberg (2007, 2013). Wimsatt (1987) notes a variety of ways in which combinations of multiple
false models might be useful: (1) “to define the extremes of a continuum of cases in which the real
case is presumed to lie,” (2) “to look for results that are true in all of the models and therefore
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presumably independent of the various specific assumptions that vary from model to model” (this
involves robustness testing, in which case “our truth is the intersection of independent lies,” Levins,
1966, p. 423), (3) “to determine assumptions that are irrelevant to a given conclusion,” and (4)
“where a result is true in some models and false in others, to determine which assumptions or
conditions a given result depends upon” (p. 31). Philosophers have especially focused on uses (2)-
(4), and there is now a burgeoning literature about robustness and the benefits of model agreement
(e.g., Orzack & Sober, 1993; Weisberg, 2006), in particular in the context of climate models (e.g.,
Lloyd, 2010, 2015; Parker, 2011, 2018; Winsberg, 2018; O’Loughlin, 2021).
However, the case of reconciling genealogical discordance discussed in section 3 does not match
Wimsatt’s discussion of the possible uses for multiple models. In the genealogical discordance
case, the multiple models involved in producing an ultimately de-idealized model do not define
the extremes of a continuum (it is hard to know what that would mean in the case of phyloge-
netics). Furthermore, they are not being used for robustness testing, meaning either looking for
common ground between the models or looking for independence from or dependence on particular
assumptions. Indeed, robustness testing in this case more closely matches the method of resolving
genealogical discordance by picking the most frequent gene tree topology, i.e., looking at where
the different models agree. By contrast, reconciling genealogical discordance involves taking model
disagreement as a signal – not that there is something wrong with the models, such as that they
have been based on faulty assumptions, but that there is something interesting such as LGT going
on in the world.
Weisberg (2007, 2013) also discusses multiple-models idealization as one type of idealization
(the other two types are minimalist idealization, where modelers attempt to only incorporate the
core causal factors relevant to their study, and Galilean idealization, where idealizations are used
temporarily but ultimately removed). Weisberg says that multiple-models idealization involves
“building multiple related but incompatible models, each of which makes distinct claims about the
nature and causal structure giving rise to a phenomenon” (Weisberg, 2007, p. 645; Weisberg, 2013,
p. 103). Multiple-models idealization will not, according to Weisberg, result in the generation of a
single best model. Multiple-models idealizations are often justified by tradeoffs between features
of the different models. Often we use multiple models because features of the real world are too
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complex to be captured in a single, intelligible model.
However, Weisberg’s multiple-models idealization fails to capture the idealization involved in
reconciliation of genealogical discordance. First, reconciliation of genealogical discordance does, in
fact, result in adoption of a single model (see figure 3). Second, there is no clear sense in which
there are tradeoffs between features of the two discordant models, as both of them will have the
same general features (although admittedly they will differ on the specifics). Finally, reconciling
genealogical discordance is not a case where we are unable to capture the complexity of the world;
surely, adding lateral branches to phylogenetic trees does increase their complexity, but not to a
point of unintelligibility.
Thus the reconciliation of genealogical discordance is not adequately captured by either of
these two influential accounts of the role of idealization in the use of multiple models. Neither
Wimsatt nor Weisberg claim to provide exhaustive accounts of how idealization operates in multiple
models, however, so the above should not be construed as a criticism of their accounts. Rather, it
should be seen as an indication that the method of reconciling genealogical discordance expands
the possibilities for the use of multiple-models idealization.
4.2 De-Idealization
In this section, I compare the case at hand to other accounts of the use of idealization in phylo-
genetics, especially Velasco (2012). I argue that the reconciliation of genealogical discordance is
importantly different from these accounts insofar as the relevant idealization – that the original
trees must be strictly branching – contributes to the formation of a de-idealized tree more auto-
matically than manually. This is a distinction that has not been emphasized in the philosophical
literature on models or idealization.
Velasco (2012) argues that tree thinking in biology (meaning: thinking about phylogenetic
relationships as strictly-branching ones) is a useful practice, despite or even because of the idealiza-
tions involved. He suggests that if we see phylogenetic models as models, then we no longer require
them to be entirely accurate; a strictly-branching model might be useful for us even if the real
relationships between the taxa under consideration are not strictly-branching ones. For example,
depending on the research question under investigation, we may simply be able to ignore any pos-
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sibility of lateral branches on the tree (Velasco considers this a case of “minimalist idealization,”
following Weisberg, 2007). However, as Velasco argues, this is often inadequate; for the reasons
discussed in section 2, we may want to investigate sources of reticulation such as LGT or at least
be able to figure out how often they occur. Velasco thus turns to a different kind of idealization
used in phylogenetics: Galilean idealization. Galilean idealizations are introduced temporarily in
order to improve clarity but are later removed (McMullin, 1985). As an example, Velasco discusses
a method of identifying lateral branches that starts by constructing a strictly-branching tree and
then looking for anomalous data that fail to fit that tree’s structure, adding in lateral branches one
by one to see if they improve fit to the data (Velasco & Sober, 2010).8
The method considered by Velasco is similar to the methods that rely on genealogical discor-
dance, insofar as both start with strictly-branching trees and then end up with a reticulated tree
(if the data suggest such a tree). Moreover, unlike in some cases of Galilean idealization, both
Velasco and I are concerned with the role idealizations are playing in inferential processes, rather
than with other motivations for idealization (e.g., computational tractability, comprehensibility).
However, I do not think that Velasco’s discussion adequately accounts for the way in which ideal-
ization is used in the case of reconciling genealogical discordance. In particular, I think that there
is an important distinction to be drawn between the degree to which the de-idealization procedure
must be performed manually by researchers and the degree to which the de-idealization procedure
happens automatically, due to the nature of the algorithms being used.
De-idealization occurs manually when the idealizing assumption is, at some point, just removed
by researchers. Galileo, for example, might begin an experiment by assuming that the Earth is
flat, over a short distance. Once he has developed an adequate understanding using that (false)
assumption, he can remove that assumption and adjust his analysis accordingly, without having to
start from scratch. Velasco’s case is also like this: we start with a strictly-branching tree, which
provides us an imperfect but still useful representation of phylogenetic relationships. Then, we add
a lateral branch – de-idealize, insofar as we are no longer prohibiting such branches – in order to see
if this increases the performance of the model. This de-idealization step occurs manually because
8This perhaps fits under Wimsatt (1987)’s category: “An oversimplified model may act as a starting
point in a series of models of increasing complexity and realism” (p. 30).
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the researcher makes a choice, at some stage, to remove the idealizing assumption that the tree has
to be strictly branching. They can then use various algorithms to check whether a particular lateral
branch improves the model with respect to the data. Of course, various automatic processes will
play a role in these decisions as well – for example, in deciding which data count as “anomalous” –
so it is not as though the de-idealization procedure is wholly left to the researcher’s discretion. But
there is a clear stage in the process where the researcher has decided they have obtained enough
information from the idealized, strictly-branching tree, at which point they are ready to test out
different lateral branching events.
By contrast, I suggest, some de-idealization happens more automatically. By this I mean
that the idealizations themselves are what produce the de-idealized result. This is clear in the
case of reconciling genealogical discordance. In this case, we see that it is the original, multiple,
idealized (i.e., strictly-branching) models that provide exactly the signal necessary to produce the
de-idealized (i.e., potentially reticulate) model. For example, a primary gene history and a minor
gene history together produce a tree with LGT, whereas two coprimary gene histories produce a
tree with hybridization (see figure 3). Unlike in a case of more manual de-idealization, modelers
do not at some point decide that they have enough information from the idealized models that
they can “try out” a removal of the idealizing assumptions. Rather, models that incorporate these
idealizing assumptions themselves produce a model that is de-idealized, in this case by means of an
algorithm. Of course, researchers’ decisions will still be relevant, even to automatic de-idealization;
one must decide to even use the algorithms that reconcile genealogical discordance, for example,
and must make decisions such as where the threshold lies between a minor gene history and a
second coprimary gene history. The importance of judgment and expertise even in these more
automatic de-idealization procedures is exemplified in the research performed by Morales-Briones
et al. (2021), which involved using multiple different analyses to test a range of hypotheses to
explain the observed discordance, a process which required considerable judgment on the part of
the researchers.
Using this distinction, we can see that Velasco (2012) has provided an example where the as-
sumption that phylogenetic trees are strictly branching is a Galilean idealization that can eventually
be removed more-or-less manually, like many of the other cases of Galilean idealization discussed
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in the philosophy of modeling literature. Methods involving reconciliation of genealogical discor-
dance, though, involve the automatic removal of the idealizing assumption that all trees must be
strictly-branching. Both Velasco and I are interested in how the assumption that trees are strictly-
branching can be removed, but the methods involved show that the assumption can be removed
in different ways.9 Like I argued in section 4.1, then, the case of genealogical discordance methods
provides an example of the uses of idealization not otherwise recognized in the relevant philosophical
literature.
Should the reconciliation of genealogical discordance be seen as an instance of Galilean idealiza-
tion? My discussion in section 4.1 perhaps indicates that reconciliation of genealogical discordance
methods fall under the category of multiple-models idealization, which, under Weisberg (2007,
2013)’s framework, is contrasted with Galilean idealization (and minimalist idealization). The
methods involved in reconciling genealogical discordance certainly (1) involve multiple models as
a starting place, and also (2) involve de-idealization, as is characteristic of Galilean idealization. I
admittedly don’t see why we shouldn’t say that these methods involve both multiple-models and
Galilean idealization, perhaps contrary to Weisberg’s taxonomy of idealization types.
Neto (2021) has also discussed the purposes of idealization in phylogenetics, although his ac-
count is more easily contrasted to mine and so can be handled briefly. Like me, Neto is interested
in giving an example of the use of idealization in science not currently captured by other accounts
of idealization, and he uses phylogenetics to do so. Neto, however, focuses on the use of ideal-
ized models in “non-representational activities” in science. Specifically, Neto argues that idealized
phylogenetic models contribute to disciplinary organization and collaboration. Neto focuses on the
(false) assumption that lineages are completely isolated after splitting – false because, as we know,
various sources of reticulation can cause tree branches to reconnect after they have split. However,
9There is another apparent distinction between the methods Velasco and I discuss. As noted above, gene
trees are thought to be strictly branching, so the assumption that these trees are strictly branching is not
objectionable in the way that the assumption that trees of taxa are strictly branching is objectionable. It
thus appears that the initial assumption that the tree is strictly branching is an idealization in Velasco’s
case, whereas in my case, where the initial trees are gene trees, this assumption is not actually false at the
beginning of the process. However, note that idealizations do not have to be false: they are assumptions
held without regard for whether they are true or false. The assumption that trees are strictly branching is
held without regard for whether it is true or false both in the algorithm Velasco examines and in the ones I
examine. Thus, there is actually less difference between our accounts than one might think. Thanks to an
anonymous referee for raising this point.
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idealized, strictly-branching trees can be useful to scientists, including in non-representational ways.
For example, Neto argues that these trees can be useful in fostering collaboration between scien-
tists by allowing them to combine their research to construct “supertrees,” combinations of smaller
phylogenetic trees. The combination of reticulated trees is much more difficult than the combi-
nation of strictly-branching trees, so the idealization is a crucial part of the practice of supertree
construction.
I think that both Velasco (2012) and Neto (2021) have identified interesting and important ways
in which idealization in phylogenetics – specifically, the idealization involved in requiring that trees
be strictly-branching – contributes beneficially to scientific practice. However, I think that methods
involving reconciliation of genealogical discordance, as elaborated in section 3, demonstrate yet
another way in which the idealizations involved in strictly-branching trees are useful ones: namely,
that the combination of two (or more) strictly-branching trees can, on this methodology, more
automatically produce a non-strictly branching tree, without the need for a researcher to take the
step of manually removing the idealizing assumption from the model.
4.3 Idealization and the Meso-Level Aims of Science
Whether the methods reconciling genealogical discordance involve Galilean idealization or multiple-
models idealization (or both), these methods certainly are using the relevant idealization – that
phylogenetic trees must be strictly-branching – as a means to developing a truer tree (a la Wimsatt,
1987). In this section, I will demonstrate how the case involving genealogical discordance differs
from other accounts of how idealization serves the aims of science, largely as a function of the
automatic de-idealization process explained in section 4.2.
First, though, a review of the relevant literature on idealizations. It has long been recognized
that models are only useful when they are, to some extent, false due to idealization. Cartwright
(1983), for example, argues that, strictly speaking, all of our physical laws are only approximately
true; she argues that idealizations can help our theories to explain phenomena, despite the observa-
tion that these theories “patently do not get the facts right” (p. 3). Furthermore, argues McMullin
(1985), idealizations can help with the mathematical tractability of our models. Wimsatt (1987,
2007) enumerates a number of additional ways in which models can be false, but argues that at least
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some of these ways are consistent with productive use of these models. According to Wimsatt, false
models have instrumental value in leading us to truer theories. False models can, for example, help
us to understand more realistic models, or help to inspire research questions or hypotheses. All of
the ways in which Wimsatt thinks that false models can be useful, though, are insofar as they help
“in the search for better ones” (p. 30). Weisberg (2013) suggests that different types of idealization
are incorporated or maintained in models for different reasons, depending on the purposes of the
research (see especially chapter 6). For example, minimalist idealizations, which involves including
only core causal factors involved in producing a phenomenon, are often best equipped to address
research purposes which prioritize simplicity of explanation as a goal. Rancourt (2017) argues that
false beliefs in general, but especially idealizations and approximations, can increase understanding.
Reutlinger, Hangleiter, and Hartmann (2018) argue for the usefulness of a particularly extreme
case of idealization, that involved in “toy models.” Toy models are highly idealized and simplified
models, such as a model of a planet’s orbit that consists of only the sun and that planet rather
than other large bodies that also exert a gravitational force on that planet. Reutlinger et al. show
that, while many cases of toy models provide mere how-possibly understanding of the phenomena
they represent, other toy models can provide how-actually understanding. For our purposes, what
is important is that they think that toy models facilitate either of these kinds of understanding
because the idealization and simplification involved in these models affords researchers “epistemic
access” to the phenomena (p. 1071). Thus, the reason for the idealization comes down to facts
about what researchers are capable of grasping, i.e., psychological facts about human scientists.
Relatedly, there is a debate, primarily within the philosophy of physics, over whether certain
idealizations are dispensable or essential to theory (see especially Shech, 2018, but also Shech,
2019; Fletcher et al., 2019; Strevens, 2019). Those who argue that idealizations are essential,
such as Batterman (2002) and Bokulich (2008), among others, point to the ways in which our
understanding of and explanations for certain phenomena (such as phase transitions) depend on
idealizations. Bokulich has gone on to elaborate this view, explicating the ways in which fictions
– idealizations incorporated into our models – are explanatory and thereby “vehicles for truth”
(2016, p. 260).
Potochnik (2017, 2020) has recently proposed an even more expansive role for false models in
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science, and indeed for idealization in general. Potochnik starts with the two observations that the
world is exceedingly complex and that our ability to learn about or understand such complexity is
necessarily limited by our cognitive capacities. Idealization, Potochnik argues, helps to simplify the
complexity inherent in the world in order to make it manageable for us to understand. This central
role for idealization helps to explain why idealizations are found throughout scientific practice, and
why scientists are usually not especially keen to de-idealize. The centrality of idealization also
helps to show that, rather than the delimited and discrete roles for idealization offered by Wimsatt
and Weisberg, there are instead many, interrelated motivations for idealization. Potochnik thinks
that some of the reasons to idealize are temporary, in which case researchers will eventually seek
to de-idealize, but that some of the reasons to idealize are permanent.
I am convinced that idealization can play all of the roles suggested by Cartwright, McMullin,
Wimsatt, Elgin, Weisberg, Reutlinger et al., Bokulich, Potochnik, among others. Sometimes,
idealization is useful because it is a step along the way to de-idealization; other times, idealization
is useful because our limited cognitive capacities make it impossible for us to grasp the world in
its full complexity. However, I think that the practice examined in section 3 indicates that these
accounts need to be expanded, in particular with respect to multiple-models idealization.
Take Potochnik (2017, 2020)’s discussion of the relationship between idealization and the aims
of science as exemplary. Recall Cartwright’s insight that the theories which result from ideal-
izations are not, strictly, true of the world. As Potochnik emphasizes, as soon as we admit that
idealizations are central to the scientific enterprise, we need to explain why it is the case that untrue
theories are by and large accepted as perfectly adequate by scientists and laypeople. Potochnik
here draws on work that suggests that science does not aim exclusively at truth. For example, de
Regt (2017, 2020) argues that understanding is a central aim of science (see, especially, chapter 2).
de Regt persuasively defends a contextual account of understanding, where understanding mainly
depends on intelligibility, and gives several examples from the history of physics to support his
view. Potochnik, like de Regt, also focuses on the epistemic aim of understanding. If scientists
are aiming at understanding rather than truth, we can make sense of the presence of “rampant”
and “unchecked” idealizations in science (Potochnik, 2017, p. 57). Crucially, understanding is a
goal which is both constrained by the world – our theories must be “true enough” (Elgin, 2004,
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2017) – but also by the cognitive abilities of those who are seeking to understand. Because the
world is too complex for us to understand in its full complexity, we use idealizations as a tool to
accomplish the aims of science. According to Potochnik, it is the falseness itself which contributes
to understanding, by making the world more intelligible. She therefore provides a more direct route
by which falseness of models or theories can serve the aims of science.
Along these lines, Rowbottom (2015, 2019) has argued that progress in science isn’t necessarily
linked to increased verisimilitude. Scientists might have other goals, such as increasing predictive
power and increasing understanding, which are not always best facilitated by truthfulness, in part
because of the usefulness of idealizations. As Rowbottom says, “Truth is sometimes stranger – more
complex, more unaccommodating, less elegant, less comprehensible – than fiction” (2015, p. 101).
Rowbottom’s view accords with Potochnik’s, insofar as both emphasize the downsides to trying to
describe the world truly, in light of other possible aims of science, such as understanding.
A popular view, then, is something like the following: If we are trying to make sense of the fact
that science often relies on false claims (idealizations), it helps to notice that science doesn’t always
aim at truth. When the aims of science are, for example, understanding (or prediction, policy
guidance, etc.), it is easy to see how idealizations might contribute to these aims, for instance by
making the complex world more intelligible to us. Perhaps we ultimately do use these idealizations
and the resulting understanding to develop truer theories, but the primary aim of science isn’t
necessarily truth-related at all.
I wholeheartedly agree with this view, and think that it is often able to make sense of both the
motivations for idealizing as well as the role idealizations play in our inferential processes. However,
I think there is more to say. In particular, I think that it is useful to see how idealization serves
lower-level, more specific aims of science, and whether these aims are truth-related. I argue that,
in cases of automatic de-idealization, idealization may contribute to truth-related aims of science
unmediated by a step that involves increased understanding.
Views such as Potochnik’s that attempt to account for the role of idealization in science depend
on the claim that the aim of science is not straightforwardly to just produce truer claims or more
claims that are true. However, often these discussions of how idealization contributes to the aims
of science fail to discriminate between more fine-grained goals that different researchers or research
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programs might have. One helpful distinction is provided by de Regt (2017, p. 90), who divides
the aims of science into three levels: micro (individual scientists), meso (communities of scientists,
for example, those working on the same set of research questions), and macro (all of science).
Others have also argued that it doesn’t ever make much sense to talk of the aims of science;
for example, Rowbottom (2014) argues that it is more useful to distinguish finer-grained questions
about scientific purposes (p. 1218-1219), in particular for discussions of realism/anti-realism. These
finer grained distinctions between different aims of science have largely not been applied to the
literature on the purposes of idealization. For example, although Potochnik (2017) readily admits
that science has multiple aims (see chapter 3 and section 4.1.2, especially for examples of non-
epistemic aims of science such as policy guidance), and indeed thinks that “whether a claim can
help generate genuine understanding must depend also on the precise aim of the research” (p.
96), she nevertheless argues that “the epistemic aim of science is not truth but understanding” (p.
91). This claim, which she devotes all of chapter 4 to defending, involves (1) discussing the aims of
science in monolithic terms, i.e., all of science has the same epistemic aim; (2) the use of the definite
article “the” to pick out a single epistemic aim of science, and (3) putting understanding on a par
with truth as a candidate aim of science. Each of these factors indicate that Potochnik is dealing
with understanding as what de Regt would call a “macro” aim of science, and her discussion of
idealization accordingly focuses on how idealizations can serve this aim.10
In the context of this paper, which is concerned with the contribution of idealizations to the
production of potentially reticulated trees, it is not very useful to discuss “the aims of science” as
though these were monolithic and context-independent. In the case of phylogenetics, the aim is
something like “to depict historically accurate relationships among taxa,” which, using de Regt’s
framework, is probably at most a meso-level aim. This aim is definitely truth-related; although, as
Velasco (2012) and Neto (2021) note, we may use idealized (strictly-branching) trees for other pur-
poses, like understanding or collaboration, phylogeneticists ultimately want an accurate historical
representation.
How, then, do idealizations serve this aim? Certainly, this depends on the research context
10Of course, individual scientists or groups of scientists may also have understanding as an aim; under-
standing is not necessarily a macro-level aim. Nevertheless, Potochnik’s discussion is largely confined to
understanding as a macro-level aim.
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and the phylogenetic algorithms used. Sometimes, this might proceed according to views such as
Potochnik’s, whereby we start with an idealized tree, this tree increases our understanding, and
that greater understanding allows us to de-idealize. Such de-idealization will likely be “manual,”
according to the manual/automatic distinction introduced in section 4.2. For example, a researcher
using the method that Velasco (2012) discusses may, as a result of making a strictly-branching tree,
have an increased understanding of the approximate historical relationships that hold between the
relevant taxa, the sorts of anomalous data to look for in checking for lateral branching episodes,
and more. We could perhaps concoct a case in which the idealized, strictly-branching tree did not
produce any increased understanding – perhaps the researcher already knew all of the information
that this tree provided on the basis of past research, for instance, or the modeler is siloed from the
overall research project in such a way as to not know which taxa are being examined. But it is
intuitive to see how producing a strictly-branching tree first would produce understanding which
could be instrumental (if not necessary) for the de-idealization procedure Velasco outlines.
The methods involving genealogical discordance reviewed in section 3 certainly need not involve
de-idealization by means of increased understanding. In Velasco’s case, the researcher does have
to have access to the idealized, strictly-branching trees as a starting point, after which the lateral
branches are added manually in the de-idealization process. In the case of methods reconciling
genealogical discordance, the fact that the de-idealization is carried out more automatically means
that, in principle, the researchers do not have to ever see the strictly-branching trees, and can just
be presented with candidate reticulated trees at the end. (In practice, researchers have many other
reasons to want to see the strictly-branching trees – including their contribution to understanding!
– but the algorithms do not require this.) Thus, idealization in the case of phylogenetic trees is
able to contribute to the construction of more accurate, de-idealized trees by means unmediated
by a stage of increased understanding.
In more general terms, then, we have a truth-related, meso-level aim of science that is served
by idealization without the idealization (necessarily) leading to increased understanding. This is
distinct from the role for idealization in views such as Potochnik (2017)’s insofar as it (1) focuses
on a meso-level, rather than macro-level, aim and (2) involves idealization contributing to a truth-
related aim without relying on other aims (such as understanding) to mediate that contribution.
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5 Recap and Conclusion
Phylogenetics has interested philosophers of biology for some time. One lingering debate within
phylogenetics, on which some philosophers have weighed in, concerns how to best model lateral
branching episodes. Lateral branches may occur for a variety of reasons, including endosymbiosis
but also lateral gene transfer and hybridization, among others. However, the predominant algo-
rithms that researchers use for drawing phylogenetic trees rules out lateral branches by fiat. How
or whether to update phylogenetic algorithms is a subject of continuing debate.
One approach, involving inferences made on the basis of patterns of genealogical discordance, is
especially interesting for philosophical debates about modeling. This method uses multiple models
generated by standard phylogenetic algorithms, each of which necessarily does not contain any
lateral branches, to infer the presence and location of lateral branches, as well as the most likely
source of reticulation at work. In general terms, this is a case of taking multiple false or inadequate
models and combining them to reach a truer conclusion.
I have argued that an examination of this method of reconciling genealogical discordance has
implications for philosophy of modeling. First, this scientific practice is not adequately captured by
existing accounts of multiple-models idealization, which focus mostly on the use of multiple models
for robustness testing. Second, the resulting model (potentially one with lateral branches) is pro-
duced by automatically rather than manually de-idealizing from the idealized models, i.e., removing
the assumption that the trees must be strictly branching. This distinction is not captured in other
accounts of the purposes of idealization in phylogenetics. Third, in virtue of the features of the
automatic de-idealization process, I have argued that the reconciliation of genealogical discordance
involves idealization in service of a meso-level aim of science not necessarily mediated by increased
understanding on the part of the researchers, a use of idealization that has gone unrecognized in
accounts of how idealization serves the macro-level aims of science.
These lessons apply to the case of reconciliation of genealogical discordance, but I suspect that
they also hold in other cases unrelated to phylogenetics, especially relating to meso-level scientific
aims. Other researchers should examine additional modeling contexts in order to continue to
progress at identifying the purposes of idealization. A further area in need of work in the context
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of phylogenetics and otherwise has to do with model evaluation. I am sympathetic to the view
that different models are more or less fit for different research contexts. It is an ongoing project to
delineate which phylogenetic models or algorithms are best suited to which contexts, and why. I
thus encourage others to continue to extend the role of idealization in science, and to consider how
we can evaluate the different uses of different idealizations relative to the purposes at hand.
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